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Abstract 
 Drones are modern and sophisticated technology that have been used in numerous 
fields. Nowadays, many countries use them in exploration, reconnaissance operations, and 
espionage in military operations. Drones also have many uses that are not limited to only 
daily life. For example, drones are used for home delivery, safety monitoring, and others. 
However, the use of drones is a double-edged sword. Drones can be used for positive 
purposes to improve the quality of human lives, but they can also be used for criminal 
purposes and other detrimental purposes. In fact, many countries have been attacked by 
terrorists using smart drones. Hence, drone detection is an active area of research and it 
receives the attention of many scholars.  
Advanced drones are, many times, difficult to detect, and hence they, sometimes, 
can be life threatening. Currently, most detection methods are based on video, sound, radar, 
temperature, radio frequency (RF), or Wi-Fi techniques. However, each detection method 
has several flaws that make them imperfect choices for drone detection in sensitive areas. 
Our aim is to overcome the challenges that most existing drone detection techniques face. 
In this thesis, we propose two modeling techniques and compare them to produce an 
efficient system for drone detection. Specifically, we compare the two proposed models by 
investigating the risk assessments and the probability of success for each model.
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
Drones recently positioned themselves as an effective multi-task weapon in 
warfare, and nation states and armed groups have sought to possess them for their 
capabilities to deliver painful blows to enemies at low cost. 
 Drones are complex technical systems that do not need a pilot inside. But they are 
operated through a pilot located at the guidance station that controls the drone remotely. 
The ground pilot is responsible for controlling it remotely, ensuring that it does not get into 
any accidents, or interfering in emergency situations. The pilot must determine the drone's 
route points, and then the drone directs itself according to these coordinates under the 
guidance of its automatic flight system. 
 Drones are predicted to play main roles in future smart cities, through their use in 
surveillance and protection systems, and for maintaining security. Although drones can be 
used to improve daily lives, malicious organizations can use them to perform physical and 
cyber-attacks on infrastructure, private/public property, and individuals. Air traffic 
management (ATM) for unmanned systems (UTM) are essential for ensuring secure and 
collision-free activity for all drone flight use-cases. Consequently, different methods of 
identifying, monitoring and preventing potentially unwanted drone missions are of 
paramount importance for monitoring and ATM systems.  
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Problem Statement 
 The high availability of small drones has raised the interest of different societal 
actors, as remotely controlled drones can be used in various projects. The widespread use 
of these technologies has generated several privacy/security and protection issues which 
need be resolved through proper monitoring systems capable of dealing with these risks 
(Bisio, Garibotto, Lavagetto, Sciarrone, and Zappatore, 2018). In the current days, drones 
are becoming more hazardous and anyone could become a direct or indirect target. In order 
to prevent these potential hazardous situations, this thesis proposes solutions to overcome 
these issues.  
Drones can perform their missions based on different technologies. Hence, the 
drone detection systems have to be comprehensive enough to detect drones of any kind. 
However, the current systems often have limitations in their ability to detect the several 
types of drones with malicious missions. To exemplify this, we consider a radar system. In 
such a system, any object that flies within the radar field is detected. Radiation is sent to 
hit the object body and then the signal is returned to the source of the radar to determine 
the object’s location. However, many drones are hard to detect and made up of materials 
such as fiber that make signal reflection very difficult or impossible. Moreover, every 
object that flies over a low range is difficult to detect through radar-based techniques. Also, 
sometimes, it is hard to differentiate between birds and drones. Therefore, in the case of a 
drone attack, our aim is to design a system to defend against the attacker drone.  
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Research Motivation 
  Malicious actors out there seek to develop drones so that they are difficult to detect, 
disable and neutralize their threat. To build a safer world, the good actors must work on 
improving the techniques to detect, counter, and destroy the malicious-built drones. 
Research Objectives 
 In order to achieve the goals of this research and address the identified problem, we 
use a descriptive approach that includes a review of previous studies found in the literature 
and the methods that relate to the topic of the research. Our research objective is to develop 
detection systems that reduce the research problems and provide feasible ways to address 
them. More specifically, we adopt some recent and powerful techniques in machine 
learning such as deep neural networks (DNN). Moreover, we combine a classic detection 
method that is based on radar with DNN to reduce false alarms as well as avoid miss-
detection. To this end, later we show the advantages of each system with comparison 
between them to produce an optimal detection system.   
 
 Literature Review 
 Bisio et al. (2018) submitted a proposal for a Wi-Fi-based statistical fingerprint 
method to drone identification, capable of detecting nearby drone malicious mission risks 
even in the midst of hacking attempts. An observational efficiency test is provided and 
shows that the approach could achieve strong outcomes of detection accuracy in several 
real-life situations, with a significant real positive peak rate of 96%. 
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 Loke (2015) presented a study focused on the services and applications presented 
by airborne computing infrastructure to mobile users. The study discusses many concepts, 
for example drones-as-a-service and flying, fly-out infrastructure, as well as focuses on 
data controlling and system configuration problems that are on an increasing growth. The 
surveyed paper clarifies the behavior of large data sets emerging from these applications, 
optimizing the design of airborne and ground infrastructure to provide the best Quality of 
Service (QoS) and Quality of Experience (QoE), situation knowledge, usability, 
performance routing, user interaction, and physical analysis drones (Loke, 2015). 
 Guvenc et al. (2020) studied technologies that rely on ambient radio frequency (RF) 
signals generated from drones, radar systems, acoustic sensors, and computer vision 
methods for recognition of malicious drone systems. Some experimental and early 
simulation outcomes are presented on radar-based range approximation of drones, and 
receding horizon tracking of drones. In addition, the study provided an overview of 
corporate methods that are measured for exclusion of drones (Guvenc, Ozdemir, Yapici, 
Mehrpouyan and Matolak, 2020). 
 According to Kaleem and Rehmani (2018) new suggested solutions coming from 
research and development arena advocate for the introduction of onboard drone detection 
systems. These solutions could make a link between the Monitoring Drone (MDr) and 
Intruder Drone (IDr) concepts.  
Drone Detection Methods 
 The surveyed literature identified different techniques for detecting and tracking 
intruding drones, such as RF sensing (Nguyen et al., 2018), Wi-Fi sniffing (Bisio et al., 
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2019), acoustic sensors (Guvenc et al., 2017), video surveillance (Sturdivant and Chong, 
2017), and radar systems (Birch, Griffin, and Erdman, 2015). The following sections focus 
on the latest methods used to detect drones in larger detail. 
Video-Based Detection 
 Video-based detection uses both graphical and electrical camera sensors to 
recognize moveable objects in the monitored environment. Generally, advertisement 
cameras can achieve an operating range of approximately 350 ft., which leads to a quiet 
desirable neighborhood of monitoring. This method uses characteristics like color, contour 
lines, shapes, and edges to categorize a typical drone’s object as compared to other things 
(Zhang et al., 2016).  
 Remote monitoring algorithms can also be used for evaluating elements over 
consecutive frames (Ganti and Kim, 2016). This can help identify different objects with 
identical shapes through their usual gestures, like drones and birds (for example, 
differentiating between artificial drone motions vs. natural bird motions). Cameras 
mounted on these systems are also very sensitive to the lighting conditions and require that 
the target is in their line of sight to be able to detect flying objects. Furthermore, numerous 
studies and research have contributed to the development of a system for the detection and 
identification of drones from surveillance videos (Ganti and Kim, 2016; Wu et al., 2018).  
Sound-Based Detection 
 Many recent studies and research have focused on the use of the voice detection 
method to detect and identify drones through tools such as correlation analysis (Mezei and 
6 
 
Molnar, 2016; Mezei, Fiaska, and Molnar, 2015). One of the leading methods that can be 
used in detecting, recognizing acoustics, and distinguishing between drones and other 
objects is the learning algorithm utilized in support vector machines (SVM) (Bernardini, 
Mangiatordi, Pallotti, and Capodiferro, 2017). Nijim and Mantrawadi (2016) presented a 
study to detect drones through their emission sounds. Other works used sound cameras and 
direction of arrival (DOA) rating for classification and tracking of drones (Chang et al., 
2018; Busset et al., 2015; Yang et al., 2018).  
Radar-Based Detection 
 Radar-based detection uses the electromagnetic principle of backscattering theory 
for drone identification. The conventional radar method is based on the observation that 
aircraft or flying objects typically show a broad radar cross-section (RCS). However, as it 
was observed through the literature survey, most modern drones are mechanical 
quadcopters, with a low RCS (Ritchie, Fioranelli, Griffiths, and Torvik, 2015). The main 
disadvantage of this method depends on the construction materials, some of them having 
dielectric characteristics close to air and resulting in little reflection back to the transmitter. 
Therefore, the new studies employ updated forms of radar detectors that harness the power 
backscattered from propellers and rotors.  
To compensate for these limitations, many studies and researches have attempted 
to use multi-static radars to analyze the signature of micro doppler of drones, and classify 
drones with various payload size (Fioranelli, Ritchie, Griffiths, and Borrion, 2015). 
Additionally, Drozdowicz et al. (2016) used frequency-modulated continuous-wave 
(FMCW) radar to extract data on the scope, kind, range, and radial velocity of drones. In 
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addition, other methods were identified in the literature studied. Klare, Biallawons, and 
Cerutti-Maori (2016) introduced a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radar to create 
256 virtual components to identify and track drones. The device can be used to determine 
whether drones reside within a given range of angular cells. This radar-based method can 
be implemented in a rather portable format, so a motion detection radar (MDR) can also 
be deployed onboard (Moses, Rutherford, and Valavanis, 2011). 
 Moses, Rutherford, and Valavanis (2011), proposed a model for a lightweight X-
Band radar system for identify drones via their Doppler signatures. Moreover, Mendis, 
Randeny, Wei and Madanayake (2016) suggested a model to automatically detect and 
classify three drones in a laboratory environment based on a radar sensor. Solomitckii, 
Gapeyenko, Semkin, Andreev, and Koucheryavy (2018), designed a system for detecting 
drones by exploiting 5G millimeter bands as radars. Lastly, Saqib, Khan, Sharma, and 
Blumenstein (2017), and Unlu, Zenou, and Riviere (2018), relied on computer vision 
detection approaches to detect drones in the vicinity of birds. 
Radio Frequency Detection 
 The radio frequency (RF) based detection systems rely on the fact that drones use 
RF signals to connect with the ground station. Drone networking protocols typically are 
carried by the same also used for Wi-Fi communications, especially in the range 2.4 and 5 
GHz. In addition, drones fitted with cameras typically relay a video stream during the same 
wireless channel to their control system.  
According to Witschi et al. (2016), morphological frequency-domain filtering is 
used to formulate an algorithm for the identification of UMTS, LTE, and drone contact 
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signals in detrimental conditions. RF identification has a very long operational range 
covering more than 1400 ft. An identified limitation of this method is that the target 
detection rate is highly dependent on the transmission energy and response of the detector. 
More recently, novel methods that depend on software-defined radio (SDR) solutions have 
been suggested. A different approach is proposed in (Yue et al., 2018), where authors 
recommend a distributed system for tracking the location and estimated direction of 
unwelcomed drones through combining SDR transmitters and wireless acoustic sensors.  
An overall summary of passive drone monitoring is presented in (Fu et al., 2015), 
where authors also establish a portable universal radio minor software design depending 
on SDR to simulate drones in various scenarios. Nguyen et al. (2018), considered a passive 
cost-effective RF sensing drone detection system. In addition, Zhang et al. (2018) 
suggested a drone detection based on RF sensing. Nguyen et al. (2016) described a 
preliminary investigation of active/passive RF methods for the recognition of drones. In 
the last two works surveyed here (Abeywickrama, Jayasinghe, Fu, and Yuen, 2017; and 
Azari et al., 2018), DOA approximation and surveillance drones established RF-based 
methods for drone optimization. 
Wi-Fi-Based Detection 
 Many operational drones are designed and developed to be piloted via the Wi-Fi 
connection, allowing professionals to monitor the drone using their own intelligent devices. 
These types of systems often typically include a First-Person View (FPV) video capability 
to transmit the feed directly to the intelligent device monitor from their integrated camera. 
In previous studies, the concept of using the Wi-Fi signal to detect the presence of 
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unauthorized drones is explored by few submissions. The basic idea is to catch drone power 
and video transfer packet streams using a Wi-Fi channel network packet capture. This 
method is incorporated in specific drones designed to identify specific types of nearby 
equipment (Liu et al., 2015).  
Nonetheless, these strategies are generally based on prior knowledge of the 
remotely controlled aircraft, such a as data about the Organizationally Unique Identifier 
(OUI) vendor used to classify the sender/receiver of unique packets (Kamkar, 2017). In 
this context, Bisio et al. (2018) proposed a novel method, where they suggest a model based 
on the study of the Wi-Fi traffic's statistical fingerprints to classify drones’ position in the 
monitored environment. The same lead author, in two newer publications (Bisio, Garibotto, 
and Lavagetto, 2018; Bisio et al., 2019), conducted research on the Wi-Fi sniffing 
dependent drone identification through statistically analyzing Wi-Fi traffic for drone 
fingerprints. Other works such as Peacock and Johnstone (2013) and Terron (2017), carried 
out studies on the identification and disarming of drones relying on Wi-Fi signals. Last 
public work reviewed here is Sun et al. (2017), where a power-efficient system was 
implemented. The system is capable of identifying and removing video feeds from Wi-Fi-
based drones, which could be an efficient mitigation solution for privacy-aware systems. 
Models of Drones 
This section discusses different drone types that were identified through the review 
of the literature and have been used in the past for a variety of missions.  
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1- Global Hawk RQ-4A 
Schelp, Corea, and Jeffries (2003) mention that these flying objects were used 
during the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq to expand the coverage area of the 
Jstars fleet. This aircraft flew for the first time in the year 1998 at a high altitude for a long 
time Baizert et al. (2006). The drone can take off with a payload of 11,600 kg. 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Global Hawk RQ-4A Kvint (2012) 
                                      
 
A heavyweight fighter, the RQ-4A is equipped with a single turbine fan and was designed 
to operate in a remote monitoring fashion from a low to medium threat environment. It is 
31.5 meters long, its wingspan has 35.4 meters, its back and forth range is 25,000 km, has 
lasted 36 hours at an altitude of 65,000 feet, and has a beneficial load of 910 kg. This 
unmanned plane can take high-resolution pictures of large areas, works in all climatic 
conditions, day and night, and flies with its own capabilities or underground control. The 
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plane can provide 24-hour observation with a radius of 1,200 nautical miles and can 
conveniently hold sensors weighing up to 900 kg. These aircraft collect data with electronic 
optical cameras and infrared cameras for stationary, not video, imaging and radar with 
image detailing, at an effective range of more than 100 nautical miles. 
 
2- Boeing X-45 
Fulghum (2003) provided the information that this plane flew for the first time in 
May 2002 and was scheduled to enter service in 2008. The plane is 39 feet long and has a 
full load weight of 2.45 kg. Its flight speed reaches 0.85 Macs, a ceiling height of 4,000 
feet, and a maximum range of 1,300 nautical miles.  
The aircraft can be armed with multiple types of smart bombs. This plane is 
characterized by invisibility, and its wingspan is 10.3 meters, its length is 8.08 meters, its 
height is 2.94 meters, and has a complete balance of 5528 kg and a range of 600 km. A 
newer model of this aircraft is currently undergoing a comprehensive development under 
the name X-45c, which is about five meters wider than the first model and is intended to 
accommodate a tonnage of approximately two tons, with the possibility of providing 
additional fuel tanks that raise its range to 2400 km. The aircraft and its flying control 
equipment exhibit the latest high-tech being one of the most advanced aircraft models. 
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Figure 1.2 Boeing X-45 Pike, J. (2014) 
                                          
 Wise (2003) discusses the possibility of providing the aircraft with fuel during the 
desalination, which would push its advantages to be closer to those of traditional combat 
aircraft. Boeing intends to make the aircraft capable of carrying eight small ordnance, each 
weighing 113 kg, that can be loaded with the entire set of GPS target coordinates. The X-
45c program has recently been expanded to also include the possibility of conducting 
electronic warfare and airspace operations. 
 
3- Predator 
  The RQ-1 Predator drone flew for the first time in 1994. With a maximum resisting 
time of 40 hours, it was able to keep in contact with the ground station within a radius of 
750 km for a period of 24 hours. Its main technical specifications are: its length is 8.23 
meters, its wing span is 14.84 meters, its useful payload is 200 kg, and it includes electronic 
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sensors, two color video cameras, a forward looking infrared (FLIR) system, an artificial 
aperture radar SAR, and a GPS satellite data link. The aircraft can fly at altitudes up to 
25,000 feet and can be equipped with laser mapping devices and two surface-to-surface 
missiles (the armed aircraft model is called the MQ-1 code).  
 Predator aircrafts connect to the ground guidance station through a ground-based 
information transfer link, or via a satellite link that is used when the aircraft is out of line 
of sight. Using these connections, the remote pilots of the aircraft can monitor the missions 
from ground-based locations and can perform up to 4-hour assignments from these remote 
locations. Predator systems were used in the Afghanistan theatre of operations and have 
been modified to be able to send target images directly to armed aircraft (Williams, 2013).  
 
4- Gnat 750 
 
Figure 1.3 Gnat, Leidy (2019) 
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This drone flew for the first time in 1989 and can carry electro-optical or thermal 
sensors. The drone can also be equipped with a SAR system. In 1994, United States 
intelligence used it on several missions in its operations in the former Yugoslavia theatre 
of operations. The drone weighs 520 kg and carries a useful load of 150 kg, can fly for 40 
hours, and has an upper ceiling of 7600 meters (Ernst, 1994; Petrescu and Petrescu, 2012). 
 
5- Neuron 
 
Figure 1.4 Neuron, Donald, D. (2019) 
 
 The development of this French drone started in 2009 and was designed to be 
pilotless and it must demonstrate the ability to perform the most demanding tasks in the 
most severe conditions. The drone is fully integrated within the environment of the network 
hubs warfare, as it must reach its target with the greatest degree of concealment through 
the lowest radar fingerprint with infrared detection. The drone approaches the designated 
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target from another source of information at subsonic speeds and can deliver its mission in 
good conditions (Harris, Pfeiffer, Rubin, and Truman, 2015; and Kihlman and Engstrom, 
2010). 
 
6- Hunter RQ-5A 
 
Figure 1.5 Hunter RQ-5A, Mons, de. (2017) 
 
 
 In 2005 the United States Army conducted its first experimental RQ-5A Hunter 
pilotless drone called the Endurance Hunter. The range, usefulness, and carrying capacity 
of the drone have been significantly expanded. This system combines a fixed-wing and 
double-wing hull to form a new tail and a longer middle wing to form a drone that can 
carry out missions of up to 30 hours at an altitude of more than 20,000 feet. The system 
can carry various external sensors, communication systems and useful loads of weapons. 
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The wing was provided with harsh points capable of carrying loads such as weaponry and 
also up to 110 liters of fuel to increase the drone's missions for an additional six hours. 
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Chapter 2 
Drone Detection and Monitoring Methods 
 
Drone Monitoring Equipment 
Typically, there are four types of drone monitoring equipment: 
1- Radio Frequency (RF) Analyzers 
2- Acoustic Sensors (Microphones) 
3- Optical Sensors (Cameras) 
4- Radar 
      These types of monitoring equipment will be discussed in detail in the subsequent 
sections. 
Radio Frequency (RF) Analyzers 
 
                           Figure 2.1 Radio frequency (RF), Rohde & Schwarz, (2017) 
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 Radio Frequency (RF) is one of the forms of electromagnetic energy, which 
includes also gamma rays, X-rays, and light. The frequency number is the number of waves 
that pass through a certain point in one second of any electromagnetic wave and is usually 
expressed in measuring units called Hertz (Fernandes, 1989). 
 RF energy is used in communications, radio broadcasts, television, wireless phones, 
pagers, police radio, space administration, and point-to-point links. Other uses of radio 
frequency energy include microwave ovens, radar, industrial heaters, medical treatments, 
military applications, and manufacturing plastic material (Fernandes, 1989). 
 Usually, radio frequency interference occurs, naturally or not. The interference is 
the effect of unwanted wireless signals as a result of one or several factors, which affects 
the receiving systems of communication devices, and leads to a decay in the specifications 
of the required signal or the loss of information about the signal that is present if the signal 
disappears other than when usually desirable. The interference radio frequency types can 
result from any of the below phenomena or actions.  
1- Natural phenomena that adversely affect the electromagnetic waves (Van Der Togt, 
et al., 2008) 
● Lightning 
● Static electricity 
● Thermal energy 
● Solar sunspot 
● Tornadoes 
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2- Electrical and mechanical devices (Van Der Togt, et al., 2008) 
● The effect of some components of electric lighting lamps (fluorescent). When 
the components of the electric lamps do not work efficiently, they emit a spark 
that results in a negative impact on the communications equipment. 
● The effect of rotating motors emits spinning electromagnetic waves of random 
frequencies that cause interference events on communication devices. 
3- Wireless devices (Mehrabanzad, et al., 2010) 
● Pictures of some devices violating the communication system. 
● Interference as a result of using one channel from more than one user in the 
same area. 
● Interference from adjacent channels due to failure to observe the technical 
standards. 
● Interference due to inter-modulation due to failure to observe the technical 
standards. 
● Interference due to malfunctions of wireless devices. 
● Overlap result overrun. 
● Receiver overload. 
● Wireless broadcast accompanying the original broadcast. 
● Radio interference noise. 
There are also some common types of radio interference: 
1- Receiver overload. 
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 If a receiver is located near strong radiation transmission systems, the wireless 
transmission issued by these systems negatively affects the specifications of the 
zoom circuits in the receiver and thus leads to weak sensitivity and causes 
harmful interference due to the arrival of intermodulation vehicles.  
 For transmitter signals to receiver antennas, there are ways to avoid this type of 
interference (Nanni, 2003). 
2- Wireless transmission accompanying the original broadcast (out of band). 
 All transmitters emit a transmitting power of the original frequency to be 
broadcasted in addition to transmitting a capacity for the accompanying 
frequencies of the original frequency, where the accompanying frequencies are 
known to be outside the band.  
 Causes harmful interference to the receiver but can be reduced by using filters 
or removing the transmitters causing these interferences to distant locations. 
(Ru, Moseley, Klumperink, and Nauta, 2009). 
3- Inter modulation product interference 
 If more than one communication system is installed on one antenna, or if there 
are high-power communication systems close to each other, then the 
frequencies of these systems will mix with each other; or the frequencies of 
some of these systems will mix with the frequencies of the mixing circuits in 
the nearby receivers creating new frequencies that can cause harmful 
interference to the receiving systems. 
 There are ways to avoid this type of interference (Babcock, 1953). 
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Acoustic Sensors (Microphones) 
 
Figure 2.2 Acoustic Sensors, Sahni (2014) 
  
 
Acoustic sensors (microphones) capture ultrasound waves that exceed the 
frequency of human-made sounds, and which are below the 20,000 Hz range. Ultrasound 
waves are studied by a branch of physics known as ultrasonic.  Acoustic sensors have many 
applications in the fields of physics, chemistry, technology and medicine. They have many 
and varied uses, as they are used in physics to determine the properties of materials such 
as compressibility, elasticity, and specific heat ratios. They are also used in chemistry to 
produce homogeneous emulsions as used in making photographic films, as well as for the 
detection of cracks in plates and others. 
Modern ultrasound generators generate waves with a frequency of up to a few 
gigahertz, by converting high-frequency alternating currents into mechanical vibrations. 
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These waves are usually detected using piezoelectric crystals or by light means, as the 
diffraction of light can benefit by making these waves visible (Sessler, 1991). 
The pickup picks up the ultrasound and converts it to electrical vibrations. Then the 
Q1 and Q2 transistors amplify it, and it is moved to the integral circuit U1 and enters it 
through the terminal 14. The integral circuit compares the phase between the captured 
signal and the signal generated by the integral circuit whose frequency can be controlled 
by the C9 fractionator and gives the circuit a frequency at junction 2. The transistor Q3 
amplifies the difference signal, and the signal is transmitted through the transducer T1 to 
the loudspeaker at the same frequency. (Ko, et al., 2009). 
 Ultrasound has been used for a long time to provide communications underwater 
and to detect submersible objects beneath it, such as submarines, in so-called sonar devices, 
which are radar-like devices, but they use ultrasound to perform their mission. Sonar 
devices are essential devices to provide safety of marine navigation. (Blumstein, et al., 
2011). Sound acoustic sensors whose frequency is in the GHz field have been used to create 
an audio “microscope” that can distinguish dimensions from the micron rank. Surface 
waves whose frequency is in the ultrasound field known as Surface Acoustic Waves (SAW) 
play an important role in electronic control equipment (Brandstein, and Ward, 2013). 
 Ultrasounds are distinguished from other waves by many characteristics, the most 
important of which are (Lundgaard, 1992). 
1- The inability of a person to distinguish them because they are beyond the human 
auditory range. 
2- They are characterized by high frequency without other waves. 
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3- They are one of the shortest waves in wavelength. 
4- They have the ability to travel at a high speed. 
5- Some animal species can easily recognize and benefit from them. 
6- They carry a medium cost in development. 
7- They can provide drone direction. 
 
Optical Sensors (Cameras) 
 
Figure 2.3 Optical Sensors Hinkle, S., et al. (2019) 
                              
  
Optical sensors (cameras) are a type of digital sensor. The optical sensors use light 
to sense things. In the past, optical sensors were unreliable, because they used ordinary 
light, and therefore they were affected by ambient light. This behavior can cause many 
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problems, which could lead to unreliable data. The new optical sensors have been improved 
and became more reliable.   
All optical sensors work in almost the same way, as they use a light source 
(transmitter) and a light detector (receiver) to sense the presence or absence of light 
(Narayanaswamy and Wolfbeis, 2013). Typically, optical sensors use light-emitting diodes 
as a type of light source.  These diodes are used because of their small size, high strength 
and efficiency, and because they can also be turned on and off at high speed and operate at 
a narrow wavelength with good reliability. Optical diodes are also used in sensors in a 
pulse style, by sending them to vibrations (ignition and extinguishing quickly). The ignition 
time is very small compared to the extinguishing time, and therefore fluctuate for these two 
reasons. The sensor will not be affected by the surrounding light, as it increases the lifespan 
of the light source (Santos and Farahi, 2014). 
 The oscillating light is sensed by the light detector, and thus the detector captures 
all the surrounding light rays and searches for the oscillating light. The selected light 
sources are invisible to the human eye. Wavelengths are chosen so that the sensors are not 
affected by the light in the environment, as the use of different wavelengths is allowed by 
some sensors.  Those are called directed color sensors to distinguish between colors. The 
pulse mode of the selected wavelengths makes the optical sensors more reliable. Moreover, 
all types of optical sensors work in the same simple manner and the differences are only in 
the way that the light source and the optical receiver are classified (Santos and Farahi, 
2014). 
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 There are many advantages to optical sensors (cameras) for drone detection, which 
are listed below (Busset, 2015). 
1- Provides visuals on the drone  
2- High quality  
3- Fast to record 
4- Potential payload can record images as forensic evidence. 
At the same time, there are many disadvantages of the optical sensors (cameras) for drone 
detection (Müller, 2017). 
1- Difficult to use for detection by itself 
2- High false-alarm rates 
3- Affected by surrounding factors. 
4- Mostly poor performance in dark, fog, and other uncertain environments. 
Radar 
 
                                         
Figure 2.4 Radar, Techbriefs Media Group (2019) 
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 A radar is an electromagnetic sensor used for tracking, locating, and recognizing 
various objects from far distances. The radar may be able to determine the size and shape 
of these objects as well. Radar devices’ performance depend on the transmission of 
electromagnetic energy towards specific targets, and on the monitoring of the echoes 
returning from them. These targets can be aircraft, ships, spacecraft, cars, or birds. Radar 
devices are distinguished by optical sensors and infrared devices in their ability to 
accurately detect distant objects even in difficult weather conditions (Cook, 2012). 
 Radar systems use radio waves instead of sound waves because of their ability to 
reach more distances and ability to perform the work even when the signal is weak. To 
understand the way radar systems work, the radar detector can be used as an example. 
Radar systems operate the device that launches high-frequency radio waves for a 
microsecond period.  Then the device that transmits the waves is closed, and the receiving 
echo device is activated, as it measures the time taken for the echo to arrive. For example, 
based on the radio wave speed, the distance to the plane can be measured accurately.  In 
the case of a special equipment, by adjusting the signals, the radar system can accurately 
determine the aircraft speed (Skolnik, 2001). Below, several types of radars that differ 
according to their use, are presented.  
1- Marine radar devices: used to determine the direction of the ships, the distance 
between them to avoid collision, and to locate them at sea based on fixed references 
such as islands (Harman, 2008). 
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2- Air radar devices: aircraft are equipped with radar equipment, in order to avoid 
obstruction of their path, and to determine air altitude readings accurately (Wang, 
et al., 2015). 
3- Radar devices in missile guidance systems: used in military aircraft to determine 
missile destinations (Manoogian, 1999). 
4- Radar devices in biological research: used to track animal and bird migration 
patterns. They are used in combination with weather radars to increase the accuracy 
of weather forecasting (Rotkovska, et al., 1993). 
There are many advantages of radar systems, some of which are outlined in the below 
list (Baizert, et al., 2006). 
1- Discovery of distant fixed objects moving from them, even if they are under the 
surface of the earth. 
2- Identification of objects by specifying their shape on the radar screen. 
3- Identification of speed of objects. 
4- Assistance in mapping accurate topographic maps of planets and moons. 
5- Long range accuracy. 
6- Constant tracking in the monitored environment. 
7- Highly accurate localization of the tracked object. 
8- Handling of hundreds of targets simultaneously. 
9- Tracking all drones regardless of autonomous flight characteristics. 
10- Mission carried out independent of visual conditions (day, night, fog, etc.). 
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Drone Countermeasures Equipment 
RF Jammers 
 Due to the rapid development of civilian drone in urban areas, many industries now 
look at drones as an aid for several processes such as, enhance productivity, aerial 
photography, geographical mapping, forest fire prevention, and agricultural pest control 
(Desai, et al., 2015). 
 The outdoor low-flying aircraft defense system is a specialized interfering and 
suppressing common drone used to counter malicious mission drones. The system shoots 
down harmful drone, by using RF frequency and GPS signal. It uses dual control, remote 
control signal and navigation signal, which makes the malicious drone unable to enter the 
defense zone, outside the emergency landing zone (Desai, et al., 2015). 
GPS Spoofers 
 
Figure 2.5 GPS Spoofers, Ranganathan, A., et al. (1970) 
 
 GPS spoofers are systems used to jam the drones’ GPS signals making them unable 
to receive data from ground control. They are advanced systems where the jamming is 
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obtained with GPS systems on the system layer side, that carry the wrong information. 
Spoofers are characterized by a medium cost, non-kinetic neutralization, and a short range, 
which can affect other radio communications (McDowell, 2007). 
High Power Microwave (HPM) Device 
 This high-power device is one of the systems used for current high-voltage 
applications such as diode. These high-power devices are used in ships, unmanned aircraft, 
power and railway stations, and large power sources that require very high-quality 
products. When used for drone detection, the high-power microwave systems carry out 
their mission with high reliability, so that the attacker drones can be stopped effectively 
using non-kinetic neutralization. 
 
Figure 2.6 HPM Device, Diehl Defence (2019) 
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The drawback of these systems come from the risk of unintentionally disrupting 
communications and their high cost. Also, the neutralized drone switches off instantly, 
falling uncontrolled to the ground (Zhang, Zhong, and Luo, 2004). 
Nets & Net Guns 
Guns are weapons used during specific defend and attack scenarios. Poorly 
designed or manufactured guns often can lead to unsuccessful missions. In the world of 
gunsmithing, there are many memories of rifles that were especially bad, many of which 
ending of the life of brave soldiers. The rapid pace of the development of firearms in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries successfully led to avoiding the repeat of manufacturing 
errors, but the memories of these weapons, some of them with deadly consequences for 
their owner, remained and their bad reputation continues (Dizard, et al., 1999). 
 
 Figure 2.7 Nets & Net Guns, McFadden, C. (2019) 
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The net gun is a non-lethal weapon designed to fire shots from networks designed 
to obstruct and foil target movement. It is used for drone detection, to sway away birds 
from aircrafts, and, sometimes to save wild birds. The net gun system detects drone and 
physically captures them, enhancing forensics and prosecution. They have a high accuracy 
of mission success, a low risk of collateral damage, and exhibit a long range for the 
deployed nets (White and Bartmann, 1994). 
High-Energy Laser 
 
Figure 2.8 High-Energy Laser, Kautilya (2020) 
 
 The military forces around the world desire to develop small, but highly effective, 
laser weapon systems that can destroy enemy missiles and drones from a safe distance. 
However, the current weapon systems that have been designed so far are large and heavy 
and cannot be installed on motorized vehicles or combat aircraft. This prompted the major 
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players in the defense industries to look into fiber laser weapons to find alternate solutions 
(Apollonov, 2020) 
 Defense systems for manned and unmanned aircraft are experiencing 
unprecedented stages of development, which requires an increasing need to achieve a rapid 
and effective response to address these threats to aircraft of all kinds. High-power laser 
weapons meet these requirements, and provide a solution to this challenge, because high-
power liquid laser weapons systems provide the speed and power of light to meet multiple 
threats. Laser weapons systems have additional offensive mission capabilities, as well as 
precision targeting with low potential for side effects (Guisado-Pintado, Jackson, and 
Rogers, 2019). 
Birds of Prey 
 
Figure 2.9 Birds of Prey, Krone (2017) 
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 Birds of prey are all birds that feed on prey, such as animals. They are scientifically 
called Accipitriformes and are famous for their sharp vision and high speed, as well as their 
flowing wings that help them fly quickly. They have large sizes and are characterized by 
sharp beaks and strong claws that can tear the prey. There most known birds of prey are 
eagles and falcons (Redpath and Thirgood, 1997). 
 These characteristics need to be mimicked in the design and development of drones 
to obtain speed and accuracy in dealing with events, especially with a reduced risk of side 
damage. 
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Chapter 3 
Proposed Drones Detection Systems  
In the design and development of unmanned systems, there is always a needed 
trade-off between drone detection and false alarm. In this thesis, our aim is to build an 
optimal model for drone detection and neuralization. Hence, we propose two models, a 
camera-based model and a combined camera and radar-based model. After defining the 
models, we will study the probability of success for each of the two models. Then, a 
comparison among the two models will be provided in order to select the one exhibiting 
better characteristics.  
Model 1: Camera Based Model 
Figure 3.1 shows the first proposed model. This camera-based model has three main 
components: Sensing, Detection, and Destroying. The first component is a camera with 
night vision to record the scene. Then, any drones flying in the field of view will be detected 
by a deep learning algorithm. The results will be sent to a decision-making tool to manage 
the operation of the destroying system. 
Unfortunately, Model 1 has some potential problems including lack of data, false 
alarms, and the inability to detect bird-like drones. Note that a potential solution to lack of 
data can use what is so-called augmentation or use the method proposed in Aker & Kalkan 
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(2017). Our second proposed model is able to overcome the false alarms and inability to 
detect bird-like drones.  
 
 
Figure 3.1 Model 1: Camera Based Model 
 
Risk Assessment 
  
Each method has its own risks of either miss-detect a drone or give a false alarm. 
Hence, this section investigates the risks associated with Model 1. Generally, weather 
hazards, failure to cover required places, quality issues, vision blocking, and some of the 
other risks can lead to miss detection of a malicious drone. However, the camera-based 
Model 1 has some important advantages such as:  
 Ability to distinguish birds from drones 
 Ability to track malicious drone and do surveillance using machine learning 
 Ability to destroy a swarm of drones even though they are self-autonomous 
Figure  Framework of the proposed method. 
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Camera Hazard 
  
 
Table 3.1 Camera Hazard 
Deep Learning Hazard 
 
 
Table 3.2 Deep Learning Hazard 
Hazard Hazard causes Hazard effects 
Weather hazards (heavy 
rain, snow, storm) 
Nature The image is not clear, or it 
is not taken at all 
 Interference  
Interference with 
another object 
Low battery Charging problem 
Sensing component does 
not work 
Small field of view Not enough converge 
Not able to detect drone 
 
Quality issues Lens accuracy 
Vision blocking  Human intervention 
Getting the camera stolen 
or lost 
Human intervention Not able to detect drone 
 
Camera does not work Technical failure 
Hazard Hazard causes Hazard effects 
 
Expensive 
 
Many hardware requirements 
High cost 
Experts (highly paid) 
Miss detection 
Lack of data 
Drone reaches a 
target 
Bird-like drones 
Drones have different characteristics 
Drone and background are alike 
Swarm of drones 
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High Power Microwave Hazard 
Hazard Hazard causes Hazard effects 
Does not be in right 
location 
Problem in tracking drone Drone will not be 
destroyed or destroying 
other things Did not go in the right time 
Problem in decision 
making 
Device does not work 
Damaged, not connected to 
power, or technical failure Drone will not be 
destroyed 
 High power microwave is 
not connected to the system 
Problem with software 
                               
Table 3.3 High Power Microwave Hazard 
The likelihood of occurrence of the camera hazards, deep learning hazards, and 
high-power microwave hazards causes of Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are obtained using the 
rating levels described in Table 3.4. Similarly, the severity of the camera hazards, deep 
learning hazards, and high-power microwave hazards effects of the same Tables 3.1, 3.2, 
and 3.3 are obtained using the rating levels of Table 3.5. Both quantitative evaluations are 
measured on a 1-10 scale. 
Rating Qualitative Evaluation Quantitative Evaluation 
A Unlikely occurrence 1-2 
B Remote occurrence 3-4 
C Occasional occurrence 5-6 
D Repeated occurrence 7-8 
E Frequent occurrence 9-10 
                            
Table 3.4 Hazard Causes Evaluation Model 
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Rating Qualitative Evaluation Quantitative Evaluation 
I No relevant effect on drone detection, 
analysis, and neutralizing 
1-2 
II Very minor effect on drone detection, 
analysis, and neutralizing 
3-4 
III Minor effect on drone detection, 
analysis, and neutralizing 
5-6 
IV Major effect on drone detection, 
analysis, and neutralizing 
7-8 
V Catastrophic effect on drone detection, 
analysis, and neutralizing 
9-10 
                             
Table 3.5 Hazard Effects Evaluation Model 
 
The risk assessment is obtained by multiplying the likelihood of hazard causes with 
the severity of hazard effects for each of the three categories of hazards: camera, deep 
learning, and high-power microwave. The qualitative risk assessment is obtained using the 
risk matrix of Table 3.6, while the quantitative risk assessment is obtained through 
normalization of the quantitative results of risk, such that they can be measured on a 0-1 
risk scale. The low risk cells in the Risk Assessment Matrix of Table 3.6 denote a low risk 
of drone non-detection, incorrect analysis, and inability to neutralize the malicious drone. 
Consequently, as the risk increases to moderate, high, and very high, it means that there is 
an increased risk of non-detection, incorrect analysis, and inability to neutralize the 
malicious drone.  
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 A B C D E 
I Low Low Low Moderate High 
II Low Low Moderate High High 
III Low Moderate Moderate High Very high 
IV Low Moderate High Very high Very high 
V Moderate High Very high Very high Very high 
                                
Table 3.6 Hazard Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
In other words, if our proposed camera-based and camera and radar-based models 
are successful in their missions, the mission risk assessment will be placed towards the 
upper left corner. If our proposed camera-based and camera and radar-based models are 
struggling in their missions, the mission risk assessment will be placed towards the lower 
right corner, with almost certainty of mission failure given by the “very high” labels.  
Since there are many unknown performance metrics that compose the hazard causes 
and effects, an actual calculation of risk is not possible at the time of writing of this thesis. 
Estimating the unknown values may be not accurate and could result in the assignment of 
subjective risk assessment values. 
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Model 2: Camera and Radar Based Model 
Fig. 3.2 shows our proposed camera and radar-based model. This second model 
includes also three main components: Sensing, Detection, and Destroying. The first 
component is a camera with night vision to record the scene. Then, any drones flying in 
the field of view are detected through the use of a deep learning algorithm. To reduce the 
false alarms identified in Model 1, we propose to add a radar system in parallel with our 
camera sensor. Figure 3.2 demonstrates the mechanisms of our second model, which has 
an added radar as an extra sensor to our first component. It is expected that adding a radar 
will reduce the false alarms, and hence significantly increase the probability of mission 
success. Once a drone flying in the monitored environment is detected, then the proposed 
system will identify it and it will be destroyed by our last component.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Model 2 Camera and Radar Based Model 
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Algorithm 1: Decision Maker Algorithm 
1. While sensing 
2.     if {a drone is detected by DNN} 
3.        {Destroy} 
4.     elseif {a flying object is detected by Radar}  
5.                {Destroy} 
6.     elseif {a drone detected by DNN || Radar} 
7.                {Destroy}  
8.     end  
9. end  
 
Risk Assessment 
 Risk assessment is also performed for our camera and radar-based system, which 
form our second model. Model 2 considers the radar hazard in addition to already defined 
camera, deep learning, and high-power microwave hazards. As it can be seen from the 
radar hazard components, inference or radar does not work instances and some of the other 
risks can lead to drone non-detection. 
It can be inferred that the camera and radar-based solution of Model 2 has the same 
features of Model 1, but in addition it helps in increasing the chances of detection under 
bad weather. 
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Radar Hazard 
Hazard Hazard causes Hazard effects 
Weather hazards (heavy 
rain, snow, storm) 
Nature 
A drone cannot be detected 
Interference Other devices 
Drone fly in low altitude 
A drone designed to not be 
detected by radar 
Rader does not work Damaged Technical fault 
                       
Table 3.7 Radar Hazard 
The likelihood of occurrence of the camera, deep learning, and high-power 
microwave hazards causes and effects of Tables 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 are obtained on the same 
manner as above. Model 2 adds an extra evaluation for the radar hazard causes and effects 
using the same models in Tables 3.4 and 3.5. The risk assessment of Model 2 is obtained 
by multiplying the likelihood of hazard causes with the severity of hazard effects for each 
of the four categories of hazards: camera, deep learning, high power microwave, and radar. 
The qualitative risk assessment is obtained using the risk matrix of Table 3.6, while the 
quantitative risk assessment is obtained through normalization of the quantitative results 
of risk, such that they can be measured on a 0-1 risk scale. 
Since there are many unknown performance metrics that compose the hazard causes 
and effects for the four hazard categories, an actual calculation of risk is not currently 
possible. Estimating the unknown values may be not accurate and could result in the 
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assignment of subjective risk assessment values that could invalidate one or both of our 
solution models. 
 
Comparison 
According to the rationale of the previous sections, an actual quantitative 
comparison of the two models is not computed. From the qualitative evaluation 
perspective, though, we can state that the second model that adds the radar sensor is more 
performant for drone detection, analysis, and neutralizing (destroying) than the first model. 
Many of the limitations of the first model, which can increase the risk of drone detection, 
analysis, and neutralizing are reduced or potentially eliminated by the second model. 
Therefore, for the same drone detection and neutralizing mission, the placement of Model 
2 in the risk assessment matrix of Table 3.6 is most likely towards the upper left corner in 
comparison with the placement of Model 1 in the same risk assessment matrix. 
Generally, if our proposed camera-based and camera and radar-based models are 
carrying out successfully their mission tasks, the mission risk assessment will be placed 
towards the upper left corner in the matrix of Table 3.6. But, if our proposed camera-based 
and camera and radar-based models are not carrying out their missions successfully, then 
the mission risk assessment will be placed towards the lower right corner, with almost 
certainty of mission failure given by the “very high” table cells.  
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Chapter 4 
Conclusion and Future Research  
 
Conclusion 
 In this thesis, we have studied malicious unmanned aircraft systems that, if left 
unchecked, may result in high risk, and can destroy vital assets. At the beginning of this 
study, we presented different models of unmanned aircraft systems that were used in the 
past. We also covered the solutions used for drone detection and destroying, along with 
outlining the advantages and disadvantages of each of the studied sensor-type. 
 The main threat in defense activities lies in the difficulty of detecting malicious 
drones. To address this threat, we proposed two counter-drone models based on smart 
sensors. The first model, a camera-based model, utilizes the advantage of machine learning 
for the detection step by using deep neural network modeling and decision-making. F 
utilizes the advantage of machine learning for the detection step by using deep neural 
network modeling and decision-making. or the second model, a camera and radar-based 
model, we added a radar sensor to reduce the risks of miss-detection identified for the first 
model. The second model also utilizes the advantage of machine learning for the detection 
step by using deep neural network modeling and decision-making. After that, we proposed 
a method to compare the mission risk assessment of the two models and inferred through 
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qualitative evaluation that the second model would provide an increased mission 
achievement evaluation in terms of malicious drone detection, correct parameter analysis, 
and successful drone neutralization. Thus, the second model is expected to outperform the 
first one in terms of drone detection and neutralizing efficiency. 
 
Future Research 
 Future research can be performed on implementing the two models, which this 
thesis could not cover. The difficulty of implementing these models comes from the high 
cost, large sizes, and lack of an appropriate environment. It is possible in the future to 
implement these systems practically and collect actual data to validate their effectiveness. 
Another research direction could potentially look into adding another sensor to the system 
or increase the effectiveness of the previous ones. The risk assessment analysis performed 
in this thesis could be used for any future implementation or re-development research. 
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